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Case No. 20090842-CA
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
State of Utah,
Plaintiff/ Appellee,
vs.

Allen Nelson,
Defendant/ Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from a conviction for distributing or arranging to
distribute a controlled substance. This Court has jurisdiction under the pour-over
provision of Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j) (West 2009).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it denied Defendant's motion for
a mistrial?
Standard of Review. This Court '"review[s] a trial court's denial of a motion for
mistrial for abuse of discretion/" State v. Madsen, 2002 UT App 345, f 5, 57 P.3d
1134 (quoting State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57, f 38, 993 P.2d 837).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following relevant statute is reproduced in Addendum A:
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (West Supp. 2008).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged by amended information with distributing or
arranging to distribute a controlled substance, cocaine, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii) (West Supp. 2008). R15. The State alleged that Defendant
had prior convictions for violation of the same statute and therefore charged the
offense as a first degree felony. Id.
The trial court held a bifurcated trial. The court conducted a jury trial on the
charge that Defendant had distributed or arranged to distribute cocaine. See R33-34,
53; R65:3-71. The jury found Defendant guilty. R53; R65:70. The court then
conducted a bench trial on the prior conviction element. See R34; R65:72-73. The
court found that Defendant had a prior second degree felony conviction for
violating Utah Code Ann. § 58~37-8(l)(a). Id.
The Court therefore entered a first degree felony conviction and sentenced
Defendant to an indeterminate prison term of five years to life. R57-58. Defendant
timely appealed. R59.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The offense

On May 10, 2009, narcotics detective Steven Bigelow, wearing plain clothes
and driving an undercover car, pulled up to a corner near Pioneer Park in Salt Lake
City. R65:16-21. He saw two males, Defendant and a juvenile, standing within a
2

few inches of each other, "pretty much touching." R65:21-23. Bigelow made eye
contact with Defendant, parked his car, and rolled down his car window. R65:21.
Defendant asked Bigelow, "What do you need?" Id. Bigelow answered, "I need a
20." Id. A "20" is slang for $20 worth of crack cocaine. R65:18.
Defendant then nudged the juvenile, who looked nervous, towards the car.
R65:21,23. The juvenile opened the passenger door and jumped into the passenger
seat. R65:21. The juvenile said nothing. R65:21-22. Bigelow again said that he
"needed 20," but the juvenile did not appear to understand. R65:22. Defendant
yelled, "Give him the 20. Give him the 20." Id. At that point, the juvenile spat out a
plastic twist containing crack cocaine, and Bigelow and the juvenile "did the deal in
the car." Id. The juvenile got out of the car and stepped back next to Defendant. Id.
Detective Bigelow drove away and radioed in the takedown signal. R65:22,
39. The takedown unit arrived within 30 seconds. R65:27. Bigelow made a U-turn
and drove back close to the takedown site to make certain that the unit had arrested
"the right people." R65:39-40.

3

Tlte motion for mistrial
After seating the jury, the trial court provided the jurors with preliminary jury
instructions and read Instructions Nos. 1 to 18 to the jury. See R65:3; R74:2-ll.]
Instruction No. 5, based on the information, set forth the charge: "DISTRIBUTION
OF OR ARRANGING TO DISTRIBUTE A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE,... § 58-378(l)(A)(ii), Utah Code Ann., as follows: That on or about March 10, 2009, at 575
West 200 South, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant having been
previously convicted under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a), did knowingly and
intentionally distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or agreed, consented,
offered, or arranged to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, to wit:
Cocaine, a Schedule II controlled substance/' R39; cf. R15.
After reading the first four instructions, the trial judge began reading
Instruction No. 5. R74:5. While reading, he noted that the instruction included the
statement about Defendant's previous conviction. See id. He did not read that
portion of the instruction, but instructed the jurors, "[L]et's just skip that, and you

1

The transcript of the jury trial does not include a transcript of the court
giving the jury instructions. See R65:3, 51. A transcript of the court's giving the
instructions was prepared later and included in the record. See R74 (inside one of
the two envelopes included in the record).
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may cross that out. That has been stricken. If you have a pen, do so." R74:5. The
judge continued, "So that it should read, The [defendant], did knowingly and
intentionally distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or agreed, consented,
offered or arranged to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, to wit,
cocaine, a Schedule II controlled substance." Id.
The judge then continued on to Instruction No. 6. Id.
After the judge completed reading Instructions Nos. 1 to 18, defense counsel
moved for a mistrial. R65:4. Counsel argued that the reference to a prior conviction
in Instruction No. 5 was prejudicial error. Counsel claimed that even though the
court had not read the instruction, the jurors had seen it in the written copies they
were following. Id. He claimed that because the charge "state[d] that [Defendant]
had been previously convicted of a similar crime ... [it] [wa]s going to highly
prejudice the jury." Id. He claimed that it would deprive Defendant of a fair trial in
violation of his rights to due process. Id. The prosecutor countered that the error
could be cured by an explanatory or cautionary instruction. R65:5.
The trial court denied the motion for a mistrial. R65:6. The court determined
that it would provide a curative instruction indicating that the erroneous language
came from "the Court's inclusion from stock instructions," and "was not [a part] of
the charge in this case." R65:6. The court would clarify that "no evidence [would
be] presented on any [prior conviction or] anything akin to it." R65:6. Id. The court
5

also noted that the instruction did not name the offense associated with the previous
conviction. Id.
Before closing argument, the court discussed Instruction No. 27A, its
proposed curative instruction, with counsel. R65:48. Defense counsel objected that
an adequate curative instruction was not possible and renewed his motion for a
mistrial. R65:49. The trial court gave the instruction, implicitly denying the
renewed motion. See R65:51; see also R74:14-15. The instruction read: "The Court
previously instructed you to delete certain language in [instruction No. 5, which
you've done. This Court prepared [instruction No. 5 from a standard set of
instructions, and inadvertently included the language you've been asked to delete
from another instruction. It's not part of this charge, was inadvertently included in
it, and no evidence has been presented in this case to support such a statement.
Accordingly, you should disregard that language." Id,
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant cannot prevail on his claim that the trial court should have granted
his motion for a mistrial after the court inadvertently included a reference to
Defendant's prior conviction in its written Instruction No. 5, which set forth the
charge as included in the information.

First, the jury was never improperly

instructed. The court noted the error in the written instruction before he reached the

6

challenged reference, told the jury to cross it out, and read the instruction without
the challenged language.
Moreover, even if error occurred, it was not prejudicial. First, the charge did
not name the prior offense. Second, the jurors were instructed that the charge was
not evidence and that they were not to consider it in reaching their verdict. Third,
the court gave a strong curative instruction explaining that the challenged language
had been taken from another instruction, was not part of the charge in this case, and
was inadvertently included in the instruction here. The curative instruction also
told the jurors that no evidence had been presented in this case to support the
statement and, accordingly, they should disregard the stricken language. The courts
normally presume that a jury will follow an instruction to disregard inadmissible
evidence.
Finally, the error was not prejudicial because, in the context of the
overwhelming evidence presented of Defendant's guilt, there is no reasonable
likelihood of a result more favorable to Defendant, absent the alleged error.

7

ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION
WHEN IT DENIED DEFEND ANT'S MOTION FOR A MISTRIAL
Defendant argues that th^ trial court erroneously referenced a prior
conviction in its instruction setting forth the charge against him. He claims that the
reference to the conviction deprived him of a fair trial and that the court should
have granted his motion for a mistrial. Defendant cannot prevail on this claim
because there is no reasonable likelihood that absent the reference there would have
been a more favorable result for Defendant.
Relevant law. When a trial court denies a motion for a mistrial based on an
incident during trial, this Court"will not find that the [trial court's] decision was an
abuse of discretion" //[u]nless a review of the record shows that the court's decision
is plainly wrong in that the incident so likely influenced the jury that the defendant
cannot be said to have had a fair trial." State v. Madsen, 2002 UT App 345, f 12, 57
P.3d 1134 (quoting State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57, f 38, 993 P.2d 837) (additional
citation and internal quotation omitted).
The burden of showing harm or prejudice for non-constitutional error rests
with the defendant. See State v. Arguelles, 2003 UT 1,194,63 P.3d 731 ("[tjhe burden
of showing [harm] rests on the complaining party"). Accordingly, reversal is
appropriate only if Defendant can establish that "the error is substantial and
prejudicial in the sense that there is a reasonable likelihood that in its absence there
8

would have been a more favorable result for the defendant/' State v. Johnson, 771
P.2d 1071,1073 (Utah 1989).
The trial court has various tools by which it can remedy errors. See State v.
Harmon, 956 P.2d 262 (Utah 1998). "[C]urative instructions are a settled and
necessary feature of our judicial process and one of the most important tools by
which a court may remedy errors at trial/' Id. at 271. "If a trial judge could not
correct errors as they occur, few trials would be successfully concluded. Moreover,
our judicial system greatly relies upon the jury's integrity to uphold the jury oath,
including its promise to follow all of the judge's instructions." Id. at 272 (emphasis
in original). Errors in eliciting the fact of a prior conviction and even its underlying
offense can be rendered harmless by curative instructions. See State v. Colwell, 2000
UT 8, \ \ 35-38, 994 P.2d 177.
"[W]e normally presume that a jury will follow an instruction to disregard
inadmissible evidence inadvertently presented to it, unless there is an
'overwhelming probability' that the jury will be unable to follow the court's
instructions, and a strong likelihood that the effect of the evidence would be
'devastating' to the defendant." Harmon, 956 P.2d at 273 (quoting Greer v. Miller, 483
U.S. 756, 767 n.8 (1987)) (internal quotation omitted).
In addition, overwhelming evidence of a defendant's guilt may render error
harmless. See State v. Gallegos, 2009 UT 42, t 33, 220 P.3d 136 (holding error in
9

admitting Gallegos's incriminating statements was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt "in light of th[e] overwhelming evidence of [his] guilt"); State v. Ford, 2007 UT
App 357U, *1 ("no prejudice could have resulted from evidence of Ford's prior
felony conviction, given the overwhelming evidence of his guilt").
Analysis. Here, Defendant has not shown that the error, if any, was
prejudicial. First, no error occurred. The jury was not told that Defendant had been
convicted of a prior offense.

While written Instruction No. 5 indicated that

Defendant was charged with distributing, having been previously convicted of an
offense under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii), the trial court noted the error
before ever reading the phrase and told the jury that the language had been stricken
and should be crossed out. R74:5. The court then read the instruction without the
challenged language. See id. Thus, the jury was never instructed that Defendant
was charged with having a prior conviction, much less that he had one.
In addition, the trial court gave its stock instruction informing the jury that
the accusation, or the filing of formal charges, is not evidence of guilt. See id. at 6;
see also R40. In giving Instruction No. 9, the judge explained, "[N]ow I'll tell you
some things which do not qualify as evidence, or which for some good reason you
should not consider in reaching your verdict. The fact that formal charges have been
filed accusing [Defendant] of committing a crime is not evidence of guilt." R74:6
(emphasis added); see also R40. Thus, even had the challenged language been
10

included, which it was not, the jury was told not to consider the charge in reaching
its verdict.
But even if error did occur, it was harmless. As a preliminary matter, the
challenged language did not even name the offense for which a prior conviction
might have been entered. More significantly, the trial court remedied any error
when, after both sides rested, the court gave a strong curative instruction.
Instruction No. 27A stated, 'The Court previously instructed you to delete certain
language in Instruction No. 5 which you have done. The Court prepared Instruction
No. 5 from a standard set of [instructions and inadvertently included the language
you have been asked to delete from another [instruction. It is not a part of this
charge, [it] was inadvertently included in it, and no evidence has been presented in
this case to support such a statement. Accordingly, you should disregard that
language." R48.
Thus, the jury was given an explanation for the presence of the stricken
language in the original written instruction that reasonably accounted for its
presence in the instructions without suggesting that Defendant did, in fact, have a
prior conviction. In addition, the court clarified that "no evidence ha[d] been
presented in this case to support such a statement." Id. Finally, the jury was again
instructed to "disregard that language." Id:, see also Dolbin v. United States, 2010 WL
1904528, *10 (M.D. Pa.) (slip opinion) (reproduced in Addendum B) (although
11

indictment included a reference to Holbin's prior conviction, Holbin suffered no
prejudice where court gave curative instruction explaining indictment was not
evidence and not to be considered in determining guilt).
As explained, appellate courts "normally presume that a jury will follow an
instruction to disregard inadmissible evidence inadvertently presented to it."
Harmon, 956 P.2d at 273 (citation and internal quotation omitted). Even if the jurors
might otherwise have considered the stricken language of Instruction No. 5 to have
some bearing on this case, we must presume that they followed the court's
instruction to disregard it. Considering the court's reasonable explanation and its
strong caution, Defendant cannot demonstrate, as he must, "an 'overwhelming
probability'" the jury would have been unable to follow that instruction or "a strong
likelihood" that the effect of the challenged language would have been
"'devastating'" to him. Cf. Johnson, 771 P.2d at 1073 (affirming Johnson's conviction
and denial of motion for mistrial; rejecting claim that the court's inadvertent
reference to two counts instead of one "may have caused the jury to speculate 'as
to ... what the second count would be for"').
Any error is also harmless in view of the overwhelming evidence of guilt.
Here, the State did not claim that Defendant personally distributed a controlled
substance, but that he agreed, consented, offered, or arranged for the juvenile to
distribute it. See R65:52-56. The State presented unchallenged evidence of the
12

elements of that offense: (1) that Defendant"agreed, consented, offered or arranged
to distribute ... Cocaine/' and (2) that he did so "intentionally and knowingly/'
R49; see also Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8. Detective Bigelow testified that on the night
of the incident he was driving an undercover car in the area surrounding Pioneer
Park and a nearby shelter, an area frequented by drug sellers and purchasers, and a
location where Detective Bigelow had personally made "close to 200 [drug] buys."
R65:17-21. He saw two males, Defendant and a juvenile, standing together—within
twenty inches of one another—on a corner. R65:21,23. Bigelow stopped his car and
rolled down the passenger window. R65:21. He and Defendant made eye contact.
Id. Defendant asked, "What do you need?" Id. Bigelow answered, "I need a 20."
Id. Defendant then nudged the juvenile toward the detective's car. " Id. A "20" is a
drug trade expression for twenty dollars worth of cocaine. R65:18.
The juvenile then got into the detective's car, and the Bigelow repeated his
request for the 20. R65:21-22. The juvenile was nervous and did not appear to
understand. R65:22, 23. But Bigelow could hear Defendant yelling, "Give him the
20. Give him the 20." R65:22. At that point the juvenile spat from his mouth a
plastic twist containing what later tested to be crack cocaine. Id.; see also R65:45. The
juvenile then got out of the car and returned to Defendant R65:22.
Bigelow drove away and radioed in the takedown signal. R65:22, 39. The
takedown unit arrived within 30 seconds. R65:27. Bigelow made a U-turn and
13

drove back close to the takedown site to make certain that the unit had arrested the
right individuals. R65:39-40. This evidence abundantly demonstrated the elements
of the offense.
In defense, counsel argued that the State had called only one witness and had
not shown why Defendant would have arranged the distribution. R6557-66. These
matters are tangential. But, in any case, Defendant did not take the stand or present
any witness to offer a different account.

See R65:45-48. More significantly,

Defendant presented no testimony to suggest that Detective Bigelow was not
credible. See id. And he presented no witness to contest the key testimony in the
case, namely, that Defendant (1) asked the detective. "What do you need?";
(2) nudged the juvenile toward the detective's car; and (3) yelled out, "Give him the
20!" See id. And he presented no argument that Defendant's question, "What do
you need?" and his exclamation, "Give him the 20!" could have some meaning
unrelated to the drug trade. See R65:57-66. Under these circumstances, the evidence
against Defendant was essentially unchallenged and overwhelming. As a result,
Defendant could not and did not demonstrate that, absent the alleged error, a
different result would have been probable.
In sum, if error occurred, Defendant has not shown that it was prejudicial.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm.
14

Respectfully submitted August \L. 2010.
MARKL. SHURTLEFF

Utah Attorney General
/

JEANNE B. INOUYE

/

Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Appellee
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Addendum A

* * * * *

Westlaw
Page 1
U.C.A. 1953 § 58-37-8 (Westlaw 2008)

c

^ ^ West T s Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 58. Occupations and Professions
Chapter 37. Utah Controlled Substances Act (Refs & Annos)

r

§ 58-37-8. Prohibited acts—Penalties

(1) Prohibited acts A—Penalties:
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to knowingly and intentionally:
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to produce,
manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit substance;
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance;
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to distribute;
or
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise where:
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages in conduct which results in
any violation of any provision of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d
that is a felony; and
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing series of two or more violations of
Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d on separate occasions that are undertaken in concert with five or more persons with respect to whom the person
occupies a position of organizer, supervisor, or any other position of management .
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (1)(a) with respect to:
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, a controlled substance analog,
or gammahydroxybutyric acid as listed in Schedule III is guilty of a second degree felony and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a first de-

© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

Page 2
U.C.A. 1953 § 58-37-8

gree felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is guilty of a
third degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a
second degree felony; or
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A misdemeanor
and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a third degree felony.
(c) Any person who has been convicted of a violation of Subsection (1)(a)(ii) or
(iii) may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as provided by
law, but if the trier of fact finds a firearm as defined in Section 76- 10-501 was
used, carried, or possessed on his person or in his immediate possession during
the commission or in furtherance of the offense, the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a term of one year to run consecutively and not
concurrently; and the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an
indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently.
(d) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (1)(a)(iv) is guilty of a first
degree felony punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate term of not less
than seven years and which may be for life. Imposition or execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible for probation.
(2) Prohibited acts B—Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful:
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a controlled
substance analog or a controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid
prescription or order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the course
of his professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this chapter;
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any building,
room, tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place knowingly and intentionally to permit them to be occupied by persons unlawfully possessing, using, or
distributing controlled substances in any of those locations; or
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an altered or forged
prescription or written order for a controlled substance.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection

(2)(a)(i) with respect to:

(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a second degree
felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, marijuana, if the amount is
more than 16 ounces, but less than 100 pounds, or a controlled substance analog,
is guilty of a third degree felony;
or

© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
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( m ) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted resin from
any part of the plant, and the amount is more than one ounce but less than 16
ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(c) Upon a person 1 s conviction of a violation of this Subsection (2) subsequent to
a conviction under Subsection (1)(a), that person shall be sentenced to a one degree greater penalty than provided in this Subsection (2).
(d) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(l) with respect to all other controlled substances not included in Subsection (2) (b) (i) , ( n ) , or ( m ) , including
less than one ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. Upon a second conviction the person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor, and upon a third or
subsequent conviction the person is guilty of a third degree felony.
(e) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(l) while inside the exterior boundaries of property occupied by any correctional facility as defined in
Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than provided in Subsection (2)(b), and if
the conviction is with respect to controlled substances as listed in:
(l) Subsection (2)(b) , the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as provided by law, and:
(A) t u e court shall additionally sesterce the person corvicted to a term of
year to run consecutively and not concurrently;
and

ere

(B) the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently;
and
( n ) Subsection (2)(d), the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as provided by law, and the court shall additionally sentence the
person convicted to a term of six months to run consecutively and not concurrently.
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsection

(2) (a) ( n ) or

(2) (a) ( m )

is:

(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor;
( n ) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor;
( m )

and

on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree felony.

(g) A person is subject to the penalties under Subsection
fense not amounting to a violation of Section 76-5-207:

(2)(h) who, in an of-

(i) violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) by knowingly and intentionally having m
body any measurable amount of a controlled substance;
and
( n ) operates a motor vehicle as defined m

his

Section 76-5-207 in a negligent man-

© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
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ner, causing serious bodily injury as defined in Section 76-1-601 or the death
of another.
(h) A person who violates Subsection

(2)(g) by having in his body:

(i) a controlled substance classified under Schedule I, other than those described in Subsection (2) (h) (ii), or a controlled substance classified under
Schedule II is guilty of a second degree felony;
(ii) marijuana, tetrahydrocannabinols, or equivalents described in Subsection
58-37-4(2) (a) (iii) (S) or (AA) is guilty of a third degree felony;
or
(iii) any controlled substance classified under Schedules III, IV, or V is
guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(3) Prohibited acts C--Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally:
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a controlled substance a license number which is fictitious, revoked, suspended, or issued to
another person or, for the purpose of obtaining a controlled substance, to assume the title of, or represent himself to be, a manufacturer, wholesaler,
apothecary, physician, dentist, veterinarian, or other authorized person;
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to procure the
administration of, to obtain a prescription for, to prescribe or dispense to any
person known to be attempting to acquire or obtain possession of, or to procure
the administration of any controlled substance by misrepresentation or failure
by the person to disclose his receiving any controlled substance from another
source, fraud, forgery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or
written order for a controlled substance, or the use of a false name or address;
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a controlled
substance, or to utter the same, or to alter any prescription or written order
issued or written under the terms of this chapter;
or
(iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or other
thing designed to print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark, trade name, or
other identifying mark, imprint, or device of another or any likeness of any of
the foregoing upon any drug or container or labeling so as to render any drug a
counterfeit controlled substance.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection
gree felony.
(4) Prohibited acts

(3)(a) is guilty of a third de-

D—Penalties:

(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not authorized under this chapter who commits any act declared to be unlawful under this section,
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Title 58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or under Title 58, Chapter
37b, Imitation Controlled Substances Act, is upon conviction subject to the penalties and classifications under this Subsection (4) if the trier of fact finds the
act is committed:
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the grounds of
any of those schools;
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or postsecondary institution or on
the grounds of any of those schools or institutions;
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other structure or
grounds which are, at the time of the act, being used for an activity sponsored
by or through a school or institution under Subsections (4)(a)(i) and (ii);
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility;
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center;
(vi) in or on the grounds of a house of worship as defined in Section 76-10501;
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater, movie house,
playhouse, or parking lot or structure adjacent thereto;
(viii) in or on the grounds of a library;
(ix) within any area that is within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or
grounds included in Subsections (4)(a)(i), (ii), (iv), (vi), and (vii);
(x) in the presence of a person younger than 18 years of age, regardless of
where the act occurs; or
(xi) for the purpose of facilitating, arranging, or causing the transport, delivery, or distribution of a substance in violation of this section to an inmate
or on the grounds of any correctional facility as defined in Section 76-8-311.3.
(b)(i) A person convicted unaer this Subsection (4) is guilty of a first degree
felony and shall be imprisoned for a term of not less than five years if the penalty that would otherwise have been established but for this Subsection (4) would
have been a first degree felony.
(ii) Imposition or execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible for probation.
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established would have
been less than a first degree felony but for this Subsection (4), a person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of one degree more than the maximum
penalty prescribed for that offense. This Subsection (4)(c) does not apply to a
violation of Subsection (2)(g).
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(d)(i) If the violation is of Subsection

(4)(a)(xi):

(A) the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as
provided by law, and the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted
for a term of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently;
and
(B) the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently;
and
(ii) the penalties under this Subsection (4)(d) apply also to any person who,
acting with the mental state required for the commission of an offense, directly
or indirectly solicits, requests, commands, coerces, encourages, or intentionally aids another person to commit a violation of Subsection (4)(a)(xi).
(e) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this Subsection (4) that the actor
mistakenly believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at the time of
the offense or was unaware of the individual's true age; nor that the actor mistakenly believed that the location where the act occurred was not as described in
Subsection (4)(a) or was unaware that the location where the act occurred was as
described in Subsection (4)(a).
(5) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class B
misdemeanor.
(6) For purposes of penalty enhancement under Subsections (1)(b) and (2)(c), a plea
of guilty or no contest to a violation of this section which is held in abeyance
under Title 77, Chapter 2a, Pleas in Abeyance, is the equivalent of a conviction,
even if the charge has been subsequently reduced or dismissed in accordance with
the plea in abeyance agreement.
(7) A person may be charged and sentenced for a violation of this section, notwithstanding a charge and sentence for a violation of any other section of this chapter .
(8)(a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to, and not
in lieu of, any civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by law.
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of another
state, conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of another state for
the same act is a bar to prosecution in this state.
(9) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof
shows a person or persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distributed,
pensed a controlled substance or substances, is prima facie evidence that
son or persons did so with knowledge of the character of the substance or
stances .

which
or disthe persub-

(10) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the course
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Df his professional practice only and not for humans, from prescribing, dispensing,
Dr administering controlled substances or from causing the substances to be administered by an assistant or orderly under his direction and supervision.
(11) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on:

(a) any person registered under this chapter who manufactures, distributes, or
possesses an imitation controlled substance for use as a placebo or investigational new drug by a registered practitioner in the ordinary course of professional practice or research; or
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate scope of his
employment.
(12)(a) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on any
Indian, as defined in Subsection 58-37-2(1)(v), who uses, possesses, or transports
peyote for bona fide traditional ceremonial purposes in connection with the practice of a traditional Indian religion as defined in Subsection 58- 37-2(1)(w).
(b) In a prosecution alleging violation of
fined in Subsection 58-37-4(2) (a) (iii) (V),
peyote was used, possessed, or transported
ceremonial purposes in connection with the
ion.

this section regarding peyote as deit is an affirmative defense that the
by an Indian for bona fide traditional
practice of a traditional Indian relig-

(c)(i) The defendant shall provide written notice of intent to claim an affirmative defense under this Subsection (12) as soon as practicable, but not later than
ten days prior to trial.
(ii) The notice shall include the specific claims of the affirmative defense.
(iii) The court may waive the notice requirement in the interest of justice for
good cause shown, if the prosecutor is not unfairly prejudiced by the lack of
timely notice.
(d) The defendant shall establish the affirmative defense under this Subsection
(12) by a preponderance of the evidence. If the defense is established, it is a
complete defense to the charges.
(13) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to any
person or circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter shall be
given effect without the invalid provision or application.
CREDIT(S)
Laws 1971, c. 145, § 8; Laws 1972, c. 22, § 1; Laws 1977, c. 29, § 6; Laws 1979,
c, 12, § 5; Laws 1985, c. 146, § 1; Laws 1986, c. 196, § 1; Laws 1987, c. 92, §
100; Laws 1987, c. 190, § 3; Laws 1988, c. 95, § 1; Laws 1989, c. 50, § 2; Laws
1989, c. 56, § 1; Laws 1989, c. 178, § 1; Laws 1989, c. 187, § 2; Laws 1989, c.
201, § 1; Laws 1990, c. 161, § 1; Laws 1990, c. 163, §§ 2, 3; Laws 1991, c. 80,
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§ 1; Laws 1991, c. 198, § 4; Laws 1991, c. 268, § 7; Laws 1995, c. 284, § 1,
eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1996, c. 1, § 8, eff. Jan. 31, 1996; Laws 1997, c. 64, §
6, e±f. May 5, 1997; Laws 1998, c. 139, § 1, eff. May 4, 1998; Laws 1999, c. 12,
§ 1, eff. May 3, 1999; Laws 1999, c. 303, § 1, eff. May 3, 1999; Laws 2003, c.
10, § 1, eff. May 5, 2003; Laws 2003, c. 33, § 6, eff. May 5, 2003; Laws 2004, c.
36, § 1, eff. March 15, 2004; Laws 2005, c. 30, § 1, eff. May 2, 2005; Laws 2006,
c. 8, § 4, eff. May 1, 2006; Laws 2006, c. 30, § 1, eff. May 1, 2006; Laws 2007,
c. 374, § 1, eff. April 30, 2007; Laws 2008, c. 295, § 1, eff. May 5, 2008.
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES
Composite section by the Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel of Laws
2006, c. 8, § 4 and Laws 2006, c. 30, § 1.
CROSS REFERENCES
Arrest of school employee, notice required, see § 53-10-211.
Attempt, elements and classification, see §§ 76-4-101 and 76-4-102.
Conspiracy and solicitation, elements and penalties, see § 76-4-201 et seq.
DUI, conviction defined, see § 41-6a-502.
Fines upon conviction of misdemeanor or felony, see § 76-3-301.
Inchoate offenses, limitations on sentencing, see §§ 76-4-301 and 76-4- 302.
Minors, suspension of driver's license for certain offenses, see § 78A-6- 606.
Penalties for felonies, see § 76-3-203.
Penalties for misdemeanors, see § 76-3-204.
Right to trial by jury, see Const. Art. 1, § 10.
LIBRARY REFERENCES

Controlled Substances > - ^
Westlaw Key Number Searches:

20 to 51.
96Hk20 to 96Hk51.

RESEARCH REFERENCES
ALR Library
118 A.L.R.Fed. 567, Permissibility Under Fourth Amendment of Detention of Motorist
by Police, Following Lawful Stop for Traffic Offense, to Investigate Matters Not
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United States District Court,
M.D. Pennsylvania.
Mark R. DOLBIN, Movant
v.

UNITED STATES of America, Respondent.
Civil Action No. l:03-cr-00118.
May 11, 2010.
West KeySummary
Criminal Law 110 N - / * * * " ^ 1898
110 Criminal Law
110XXXI Counsel
11 OXXXI(C) Adequacy of Representation
110XXX1(C)2 Particular Cases and Issues
1 IQkl898 k. Severance of Charges.
Most Cited Cases
Defendant's trial counsel's failure to move to sever
charges against defendant did not render counsel's
assistance ineffective. Defendant was arrested after
former cohort cooperated with police in drug trafficking sting operation, and convicted of conspiracy to
distribute and possess methamphetamine, distribution
and possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, possession of firearms by a convicted
felon, and obstruction of justice. In light of the overwhelming evidence against defendant including former cohort's testimony which was bolstered by that
of investigators, there was no reasonable probability
that the jur\ f s verdict would have been d'Sf^rcni if
counsel had made a successful motion to sever the
charges against him.
Christy H, Fawcett U.S. Attorney's Office, Hamsburg, PA, for Respondent.
MEMORANDUM
YVETTE KANE. Chief Judge.

*1 Before the Court is Movant Mark Dolbin's motion
to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 2255. (Doc. No. 250.) Since
filing his initial motion alleging ineffective assistance
of trial and appellate counsel and improper jury instructions, Dolbin amended his § 2255 motion to add
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at his preliminary hearing. (Doc. No. 253.) For the reasons set
forth below, the motion will be denied.
I. BACKGROUND
Movant Mark Robertson Dolbin was indicted on May
14, 2003, for conspiracy to distribute and possess
with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of
methamphetamine. as well as distribution and possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of
methamphetamine. (Doc. No. 1.) The indictment was
subsequently amended multiple times to include the
charges of possession of firearms by an armed career
criminal, obstruction of justice, and forfeiture, resulting in the fourth and final superseding indictment
being filed on August 4, 2004. (Doc. No. 121.) Dolbin pleaded not guilty and went to trial, along with
co-Defendant Ly Bun Mey, on March 7, 2005. (Doc.
Nos.127, 182.) On March 10, 2005. the jury returned
a verdict against Dolbin on four counts: conspiracy to
distribute and possess methamphetamine. distribution
and possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, possession of firearms by a convicted
felon, and obstruction of justice. (Doc. No. 200, at 1.)
The jury found co-Defendant Mey not guilty.— On
July 25. 2005. Dolbin was sentenced to life in prison.
(Doc. No. 199.) Dolbin successfully appealed that
sentence and was re-sentenced to 240 months m
prison on August 20, 2007. (Doc. No. 233.)
FN1. In Court, Roger Frey, one of the Government's key witnesses, misidentified Mey
in court. (Trans 2. at 188.) Additionally,
Mey testified on his own behalf that, while
he knew the passenger in his car possessed
drugs, he did not possess or distribute drugs.
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(Trans. 4 at 36-47.)
Dolbin filed a "consolidated application to proceed in
forma pauperis" on February 1, 2008, in response to
which this Court sent a notice of election. (Doc.
Nos.239, 243.) Dolbin returned the notice of election
indicating his desire to file one, all-inclusive § 2255
motion at a later date. (Doc. No. 244.) Dolbin then
filed a motion to extend time to file his § 2255 motion, but attached the "working copy" of his motion
to vacate thereto. (Doc. No. 248, 250.) To preserve
the filing date of the motion to vacate, the Court ordered that the attachment be docketed as a § 2255
motion and later allowed Dolbin leave to supplement
the claims he had already included in his § 2255.
(Doc. No. 253.) The Government has now responded
to all of Dolbin's claims, and Dolbin has replied to
the Government's arguments. Dolbin's motion to vacate, set aside,, or correct sentence pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2255, is now before the Court for disposition.
H. DISCUSSION
A. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel
At trial, Dolbin was represented by Attorney Nicholas Quiim. Dolbin alleges that Quinn was ineffective
for failing to move to sever the charges of conspiracy
and drug possession from the felon in possession of
firearms and obstruction of justice counts. (Doc. No.
251.) Specifically, Dolbin contends that revelation to
the jury of his fifteen-year-old convictions "and other
concomitant spillover evidence" was improperly
prejudicial and contributed to the jury verdict against
him. Dolbin also argues that Quinn should have
moved to sever his trial from that of co-Defendant Ly
Bun Mey. Dolbin admits that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8 provides for "liberal joinder" of
claims against one Defendant and joint trials against
multiple Defendants, but argues that his counsel
should have moved for relief from joinder and for
severance pursuant to Rule 14 because joinder of the
claims against him was, in this case, prejudicial.
*2 To succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim, a defendant must show that his counsel's performance was deficient, which is to say that it "fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness," and
that he was prejudiced by his counsel's deficient performance. Outten v. Kcamcv, 464 F.3d 401. 414 (3d

Cir.2006) (citing Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S.
668. 687. 104 S.Ct. 2052. 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)).
Because failure to establish either prong results in
denial of a defendant's claim, a court may begin its
analysis with either prong of the test. United States v.
Cross, 308 F.3d 308. 315 (3d Cir.2002). In assessing
counsel's conduct, there is a "strong presumption"
that counsel acted reasonably, and "a court deciding
an actual ineffectiveness claim must judge the reasonableness of counsel's challenged conduct on the
facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of
counsel's conduct." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90.
With respect to the prejudice prong, a defendant must
prove that "there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt." Id at 695.
1. Dolbin was not Prejudiced by Counsel's Alleged
Errors
The Court takes up its analysis of Dolbin's claim with
the prejudice prong of the Strickland test. Though
Dolbin's brief suggests reasons counsel may have
stipulated to his past convictions, moved to sever the
claims against him, and moved to bifurcate the trial,
Dolbin has not shown that, but for counsel's decisions
on these matters, there is a probability the jury would
have found him innocent of the crimes charged. This
is true whether the Court considers the prejudice established by each of these alleged deficiencies individually or all the issues alleged cumulatively. See
Fahv v. Horn, 516 F.3d 169. 205 (3d Cir.2008) ("Individual errors that do not entitle a petitioner to relief
may do so when combined, if cumulatively the prejudice resulting from them undermined the fundamental fairness of his trial and denied him his constitutional right to due process.").
The evidence that supports Dolbin's guilty verdict is,
simply put, immense. The Government's first witness,
Agent Tyer, testified that a man by the name of
Roger Frey was discovered transporting drugs during
a drug interdiction stop of a bus in Colorado. (Trans.
2 at 34-60.) Frey confessed to the crime and cooperated with the Government, eventually admitting that
he was delivering the drugs to the person later identified as Mark Dolbin, a Pottsville, Pennsylvania resident. (Id.)
Next, Roger Frey himself testified. Frey confessed
that he was transporting methamphetamine for Mark
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Dolbm Frey testified that he met Dolbm through a
cousin, saw him in possession of large quantities of
cash, and knew him to be a methamphetamme dealer
before they began working together (Id at 65-70)
Fiey further testified in detail that he took a trip to
California, purchased methamphetamme with money
that was sent to him m pizza boxes, gave the
methamphetamme to a man named "Blaze" to transport back to Pennsylvania, reconnected with Blaze in
Pennsylvania, and then personally transfened four
pounds of methamphetamme to Mark Dolbm (Id at
71-81 ) Fiey also testified that he purchased drugs for
Dolbm a second time Frey testified that for the second trip, Dolbm gave him $55,000 m cash to take to
California to purchase five more pounds of methamphetamme (Id at 88-91 ) Frey explained to the jury
that federal authorities intercepted him m Colorado
with the methamphetamme in his suitcase, but that he
cooperated with the police and agreed to complete
the drug transaction with Dolbm (Id at 91-97 ) Under police surveillance, Frey called Dolbm to make
arrangements for Dolbin to letneve him, and the
drugs, at the Hamsburg bus station (Id) Frey testified that Dolbin arrived at the bus station at the appointed time in a blackish Mercedes (id at 9b ) Frey
stated that, while wearing a wire and being observed
by police, he placed the luggage containing the
methamphetamme — m the trunk of the Mercedes,
and entered Dolbin's vehicle (Id at 96-97 ) Frey testified that he was m the Mercedes with Dolbin when
police officers attempted to stop the vehicle, and
Do!Dm evaded them by initiating a high-speed car
chase (Id at 99 ) Frey explained that Dolbin eventually abandoned the \ ehicle and fled on foot m an attempt to avoid arrest (Id) Last, Frey testified that
Dolbin had used two firearms m the course of their
transactions, one of which was a Stieetsweeper rifle
that Dolbin brandished for the purpose of showing
Frey "that he had fire power " (Id at 101-03 )
FN2 The police had actually replaced the
rrethamphetarrme with a non-controlled
substance though Frey testified he was unawai e of this fact at the time he completed
the transaction with Dolbin (Tians 2 at 99 )
*3 The Government also introduced a tape recoidmg
that w as made of the conversation between Frey and
Dolbin when Dolbm picked Frey up fiom the bus
station (Id at 104) That recording memorialized
Dolbin referring to * crystal" and making ' five out of

four " (Id) Frey testified that both of these references
were related to methamphetamme (Id at 104-05 )
Next, the Government produced testimony from DEA
Agent John Langan Langan stated that he observed
the controlled purchase between Frey and Dolbin at
the Hamsburg bus station (Id at 163-65 ) Langan
identified Dolbin as the man m the Mercedes who
picked Frey up from the bus station, and stated that
he observed the two depart the bus station together m
the Mercedes with Fie>'s suitcase-and the sham
methamphetamme-m the trunk (Id at 165-66 )
Lower Paxton Township Police Officer Alonzo Piper
testified that he arrested Maik Dolbm when Dolbm
was attempting to hitch a ride to Pottsville from a
location two miles from the scene where the highspeed car chase had ended the previous day (Id at
170-71 ) Piper made the arrest because Dolbin
matched the description given by the officers involved in the chase of the man who had fled (Id at
172)
D E \ Agent Joseph Mye^s testified that be was a^o
involved in the arrest of Mark Dolbm Agent Myers
stated that he tested the package of white powder
initially found in Colorado in Roger Frey's luggage
The substance was determined to be approximately
five pounds of crvstal methamphetamme (Id at 17578 ) Agent Myers also discussed his observations of
the monitored calls between Frey and Dolbm dunng
which Frey made plans with Dolbin to meet at the
Hamsburg bus station (Id at 182-83 ) Myers further
testified that he was part of the effort to follow Dolbin's Mercedes fi om the bus station, stop the \ ehicle,
and arrest Dolbm (Id at 185-89) M^sers described
the high-speed chase that ensued wherein Dolbin
drove m excess of 100 miles per hour and into oncoming traffic in an attempt to evade police (Id)
Agent Myers also testified that he later executed a
search warrant on a storage unit rented in Dolbin's
name (id at 1°2 ) In tfie storage unit M* eTs unco\ered two fnearms and a stolen >ellow Mercedes Benz
with a broken trunk (Id at 193-^4 )
Karlene DiCello Dolbin s fiancee also testified
against Dolbin She admitted that Dolbin called her
after he was arrested and asked her to remo\e from
their residence a gun and a scale (Id at 211 ) She
had been unaware these items were in the home, so
she asked James Connois, a friend of Dolbin s, to
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remove them. (Id.) DiCello testified that, even after
Connors removed one firearm and a scale from the
home, police executed a search warrant on the house
and found approximately Si0.000 in cash and another
firearm. (Id. at 212-215.) DiCello also told the jury
that, after Dolbin's arrest, he called to tell her that he
had a yellow Mercedes in a storage unit and that
there was money for her in the trunk. (Id. at 215-16.)
*4 Byron DiCello, Dolbin's stepson, testified that he
had been asked to remove "baggies" from his house
at his mother's request after Dolbin's arrest. (Id. at
228-33.) He also revealed that he had once accidentally seen a cooler full of white powder at his home,
though he could not confirm that the substance was
methamphetamine. (Id.)
The Government next produced the testimony of Edward Hunt, Dolbin's cell mate at Cumberland County
jail. Hunt testified that Dolbin gave him a note to
hold during a cell search. (Id. at 235-37.) Hunt, in
turn, gave the note to prison authorities. The note was
addressed to "Jack," which is the name of one of
Mark Dolbin's brothers. The note stated that Dolbin
would have cash in ten days to pay an attorney and
asked Jack to remove firearms being stored in his
aunt's former bedroom in his mother's house. (Id. at
237.) The note also requested that Jack retain Attorney Dimitriou on Dolbin's behalf. (Id.) Attorney
Dimitriou did in fact enter an appearance for Dolbin
on June 5, 2003. (Doc. No. 14.) In a separate incident, Dolbin asked Hunt to collect approximately
$60,000 in drug debts for Dolbin so that Dolbin
would have money to pay his legal fees. (Trans. 2 at
239-40.) At the time, Dolbin and Hunt both believed
Hunt was on the verge of being released. (Id.) Hunt
testified that he wrote down the names and addresses
of the two debtors from whom Dolbin told him to
collect the money. (Id. at 242-43.) In later testimony,
Cameron Dolbin confirmed that the two men identified by Hunt were known friends or acquaintances of
his brother. Defendant Mark Dolbin. (Trans. 3 at 13.)
Both notes were produced for the jury.
James Connors, self-described as Dolbin's best
friend, testified next. Connors admitted that he removed a scale and a rifle from Dolbin's resident at
DiCello's request, and that he eventually turned those
objects over to the police. (Trans. 2 at 255-57.) Connors further stated that DiCello asked him to go to a
storage unit rented by Dolbin to recover money from

the trunk of a car located within. (Id. at 258.) Connors explained that, with the help of Mark Dolbin's
brother, Cameron, and others, he broke into the storage unit and pried open the trunk of a yellow Mercedes. (Id. at 260-61.) He admitted that he recovered
satchels containing over $40,000 cash, methamphetamine, and multiple handguns from the car. (Id.
at 261-63.) He hid one satchel himself and gave another to Cameron Dolbin for disposal. (Id. at 264.)
They left one shotgun in the car, however, because
they did not want to risk someone seeing the larger
shotgun in their own vehicle once they left the premises. (Id.)
Cameron Dolbin also testified. His account echoed
Connors' account of breaking into his brother's storage unit. (Trans. 3 at 6-8.) He stated that they removed three bags from a yellow Mercedes, and the
bag he took possession of contained several handguns. (Id. at 10.)
*5 DEA Agent Michael Mish testified that when he
executed a search warrant on a different storage facility rented by Defendant Dolbin, he found telephone
bills and other documents with Mark Dolbin's name
on them. (Id. at 24.) Mish also found a recipe for how
to manufacture methamphetamine and a video entitled "Cookin' Crank with Uncle Fester" in the unit.
(Id. at 25-26.) The Government produced copies of
these documents and items at trial. (Id. 25-26.)
DEA Agent Barrett was able to corroborate the testimony of many of the Government's prior witnesses.
Barrett corroborated Roger Frey's testimony that
Dolbin wired Frey money via Western Union through
the records of the money transfer. (Id. at 60-61.) Barrett corroborated the testimony of other DEA Agents
when he stated that he, too, observed Frey and Dolbin
in a black Mercedes at the Harrisburg bus station,
which eventually resulted in a high-speed car chase.
(Id. at 37-40.) Barrett corroborated James Connors'
testimony that Connors turned over to me police a
rifle and scale which Connors said had been removed
from DiCello and Dolbin's residence. (Id. 43-45.)
Barrett corroborated the testimony of Ed Hunt when
he explained that he recovered in excess of a dozen
firearms in Dolbin's aunt's bedroom, located within
Dolbin's mother's home. (Id. 46-47.) Barrett corroborated Cameron Dolbin when he stated that he recovered a black bag containing three handguns hidden
under leaves near Cameron Dolbin's house. (Id. 50.)
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Barrett also corroborated DiCello's testimony that
$10,000 cash and a shotgun were found at her residence. (Id. at 42-43.) The shotgun found was identified as a Streetsweeper, which matched Frey's description of the firearm Dolbin had shown to him.
Last, as Defendant points out in his brief, Agent Barrett did testify that Defendant had prior convictions: a
1985 conviction for possession with intent to deliver
drugs, 1987 convictions for possession with intent to
deliver drugs and possession of a prohibited offensive
weapon, and a 1987 conviction for "causing or risking a catastrophe." (Id. at 62-64.) No details related
to these offenses were disclosed, and they were not
expounded upon in any way.
The Government also produced testimony of Ceven
Huer Kong. Kong, known by the nickname "Lazy,"
admitted he did not know Mark Dolbin, but he corroborated Roger Frey's testimony related to how Frey
made his purchases of methamphetamine in California. (Id. at 143.) Kong testified that he sold four
pounds of methamphetamine to Roger Frey on one
occasion and five more pounds on a second occasion.
( M a t 150, 152.)
To say the least, the evidence against Defendant Dolbin was significant. Even if Defense Counsel Quinn
had made a successful motion to sever the charges
against Dolbin, bifurcate the trial, or had stipulated to
the prior offenses, the Court cannot find any reasonable probability that the jury's verdict would have
been different in light of the tremendous amount of
evidence against Dolbin. Even if a separate trial had
been held on each charge and no evidence of any past
conviction or other crime had been admitted, the end
result would assuredly remain unchanged.
*6 The Court arrives at this conclusion not only in
light of the sheer number of witness accounts which
inculpated Dolbin on each of the four charges, but
with particular consideration of the way the different,
unrelated witnesses' accounts corroborated each
other, fit together, and were enhanced by the direct
evidence produced through the police investigation.
For example, Frey's testimony was corroborated by
documentation, receipts, and phone records in addition to the testimony of DEA Agents and Kong. Multiple agents were able to testify as to their personal
knowledge of different aspects of Frey's testimony,
bolstering it tremendously. Moreover, the testimony
of Dolbin's friends and family was consistent not
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only with itself and the recorded phone calls and intercepted message Dolbin made to them, but also
with the evidence police found during the investigation of Connors' home, the storage units, and Dolbin's
residence. Lastly, the recorded statements of Dolbin
speaking about "crystal" and questioning Frey as to
how to make "five out of four" were particularly
damning. The compelling and thorough nature of the
evidence provided against Dolbin as to not only the
drug trafficking charges, but also the possession of
firearms charge and the obstruction of justice charge
simply makes untenable Defendant's claim that any
prejudice which may have resulted from inclusion of
his past convictions, Quinn's failure to bifurcate or
sever the charges, and Quinn's failure to act on the
litany of other unsupported grounds referred to in
passing in Defendant's brief. Because Dolbin cannot
show even a small likelihood that the verdict rendered would have been different had counsel pursued
a different trial strategy, his ineffective assistance of
counsel claim must fail.
2. Counsel's Performance was not Deficient
Notwithstanding Dolbin's failure to demonstrate
prejudice, the Court also notes that Dolbin's argument
that Defense counsel was ineffective for failing to
sever his trial from that of co-Defendant Mey does
not hold water. (Doc. No. 187.) First, Mey and Dolbin were charged as part of the same conspiracy, thus
the claims were properly joined under Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 8. See United States v. Eufrasio. 935 F.2d 553. 567 (3d Cir.1991). Although Rule
14 provides that "if it appears that the defendant... is
prejudiced by a joinder of offenses or of defendants
... the court may order an election or separate trials,"
Dolbin has not shown any prejudice that resulted
from the joint trial, a prerequisite for a successful
motion to sever. Fed.R.Crim.P, 3 4. Counsel cannot
be deemed ineffective for failing to make a motion
that would have been deemed unsuccessful. Eufrasio,
Q?5 F.2d at 56$ (requiring a defendant to demonstrate
that failure to sever resulted in ''clear and substantial
prejudice resulting in a manifestly unfair trial" to
succeed on such a claim).
Though Mey testified, his testimony did not touch in
any way upon the likelihood of Dolbin's guilt or the
believability of witnesses against Dolbin. If anything,
Mey's testimony benefitted Dolbin because, if believed, it provided impeachment evidence against
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Frey, a primary Government witness implicating
Dolbin Moreover, the jury was clearly able to compartmentalize the evidence produced against Mey and
the evidence produced against Dolbin since they arn\ed at two distinct verdicts for the two Defendants
Lnited States x De Pen, 7^8 F 2d 963 984 (3d
Cir 1985) ("The proper question on appeal is whether
the jury could have been reasonably expected to
compartmentalize the allegedly prejudicial evidence ") Dolbin has not demonstrated that a motion to sever his trial from that of Mey would have
been meritorious, thus Attorney Qumn cannot be
deemed ineffective for failing to make such a motion
*7 Likewise, Dolbm's argument that Attorney Qumn
was ineffective for failing to move to sever the firearm, drug trafficking, and obstruction of justice
charges is unavailing Evidence of weapons would
ha\e been admissible against Dolbm at a trial for
drug trafficking, and vice versa, thus a motion to
sever would have had little chance of success Evidence of firearm use has been recognized as "tools of
the naicotics trade," allowing at least some evidence
of firearm use to be admitted as circumstantial evidence of drug trafficking m drug trafficking trials
e\ en u hen not charged as a separate offense United
States ^ Russell 134 F 3d 171 183 (3d Cir 1Q98)
("[l]t has long been recognized that firearms are lele\ ant evidence m the prosecution of drug-related offenses, because guns are tools of the drug trade ")
Conversely, possession of drugs has been held admissible in a firearms possession case as evidence of
a motive to possess firearms See United States \
Goiecki, 813 F 2d 40 42-43 (3d Cir 1987) (denying
motion to sever claim because "possession of the
weapon would likely be admissible in the drug case"
and Rule 404(b) would admit evidence of drug trafficking as motive not to register weapons), see also
United States ^ Moiena 547 F 3d P I (3d Cir 2008)
(admission of some evidence of diug transactions
acceptable under Rule 404(b) to show motive, but
o\c*n^e rnav cause incurable prejudice) Indeed the
testimony relating to the fiiearm possession charges
and the diug trafficking charges overlapped, indicating that the judicial consideiations of efficiency
weighed m favor of joining the claims because man)
witnesses would have had to testify twice Eufiasw
Q
3^ F 2d at 568 (discussing that, m determining a
motion to sever, the trial court should consider the
public interest m judicial economy as well as prejudice to the defendant) Thus, any motion to sever the
firearm from the drug trafficking claims would have
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been nonmentonous
Dolbm's argument that Attorney Qumn should have
moved to sever the obstruction of justice charge is
incorrect for the same reason Dolbm's attempts to rid
his residence of drug and firearm evidence would
likely have been admissible in a trial only charging
his drug distribution or his firearm possession because it is evidence that he participated m drug distribution and possessed firearms Also, due to the fact
that the obstruction of justice was linked to his firearm possession and drug trafficking, the interrelated
nature of the charges w ould have made a bifurcated
trial inefficient, and complete separation of all evidence of drug and gun use from the obstruction attempt impossible
For the reasons stated above, the Court finds that,
even when taking all alleged facts as true and m the
light most favorable to Defendant Dolbin Dolbin has
not demonstrated that he was prejudiced by Defense
Counsel's performance Not only would motions to
sever or bifurcate the trial have had little chance of
success, but the evidence presented against Dolbin on
each count was overwhelming and aid not bear soiely
on the credibility of one or two witnesses, thus it
cannot be said that prejudice, rather than the e\idence, resulted m the verdict against him See
Moiena ^47 F 3d at 196 (stating that if a case against
a defendant is strong and the evidence overw helming,
improperly-admitted premdicial evidence does not
violate due process)
B. Clear Error in Jury Instructions/Ineffecthe
4ssistance For Failing to Challenge Jury Instructions
*8 Dolbin argues that the jury instructions used at
tiial m Counts III and IV uclated his right to due
process Counts III and IV of the Fourth Superseding
Indictment charged Dolbin with 'possession of fnearms by an armed caieer criminal m violation of 18
U S C H 922(g) and 924(e) and with obstruction of
justice m violation of 18 U S C frfi ni2'c)n)-(2)
and 2 Dolbin first alleges that the instructions the
Court provided for tnese charges lmpermissibh relieved the Government of its burden of proof that he
was convicted of three or moie crimes punishable by
more than one year because the instructions implied
that Dolbin s prior criminal convictions w ere "established fact" Dolbin also contends that the Courts
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instruction that flight may be taken as consciousness
of his guilt improperly implied that the flight may be
taken as evidence of his guilt as to the felon-inpossession charge as well as the obstruction of justice
charge, in addition to the drug trafficking charges. He
also argues that the wording of the instruction implied that he had already been convicted of committing the crimes charged. Last, Dolbin alleges that the
submission to the jury of a summary chart prepared
by the Government was so prejudicial as to violate
his due process rights.
To succeed on a claim of a trial error that is raised for
the first time on collateral review, a defendant must
show that there was "cause" for the failure to raise
the issue on direct appeal and that there was "prejudice" resulting from the failure, or, that he is actually
innocent of the crimes charged. Hodge v. United
States, 554 F.3d 372. 379 (3d Cir.2009). If a defendant cannot meet either requirement, the claim will
be dismissed as procedurally defaulted. Id.
Dolbin's initial motion does not appear to allege
cause and prejudice from the failure to object to the
jury instmctions on the above-mentioned bases at
trial. Yet, in his "objections" to the Government's
brief in opposition to his S 2255 motion, he requests
that the claim be considered as part of an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim. An allegation that defense counsel was ineffective may satisfy the cause
requirement of this test. Id. Accordingly, in construing the motion in the light most favorable to Dolbin,
a pro se litigant, the Court will examine the claims of
improper jury instructions as additional claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel-that Attorney Quinn
was ineffective for failing to object to the jury instructions on the bases mentioned in Dolbin's motion.
With respect to Dolbin's first challenge, that the jury
instructions relieved the Government of its burden of
proof on the felon-in-possession charge, the Court
clearly instructed the jury that the Government has
the burden of proof as to each element of each of the
crimes charged. The Court re-emphasized this directive at least seven more times in the course of the
closing jury instructions. (Trans. 4 at 101, 102, 110,
112-113, 123, 132.) In discussing the charge that
Dolbin possessed firearms and ammunition as a convicted felon in violation of 18U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and
924(e), the Court specifically instructed:

*9 In Count 3, the Defendant Mark Robertson
Dolbin is charged in the fourth superseding indictment with being a previously convicted felon in
possession of firearms and ammunition. Ly Bun
Mey is not charged with this crime.
Specifically, Count 3 of the indictment reads,
Beginning at a time unknown to the grand jury and
continuing through approximately June 1 st, 2003,
in Dauphin County and Schuylkill County, Pennsylvania, within the Middle District of Pennsylvania and elsewhere, the Defendant Mark Robertson Dolbin, having been convicted in the Schuylkill County Court of Common Pleas of three or
more violent felonies or serious drug offenses or
both in the following cases, Number 257-CA-1984,
Number 748-CA-f981, Number 12-CA-1982,
Number 27-CA-1982, which are crimes punishable
by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year,
did knowingly possess in and affecting commerce
firearms and ammunitions as listed below.
You will see in the copy of the indictment that's
provided to you that there are nine firearms listed
there in the indictment. The indictment alleges that
Mr. Dolbin was in possession in violation of Title
18. United States Code, Section 922(g)(1) and
924(c).
The crime of being a felon in possession of firearms has three essential elements: First, that the defendant has been convicted of a crime punishable
by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year;
secondly, that the defendant thereafter knowingly
possessed firearms and ammunition; and, finally,
that these firearms and ammunition were transported across the state line at some time during or
before the defendant's possession of them.
You're instructed that possession with intent to
deliver drugs, possession of a prohibited offensive
weapon, and causing or risking a catastrophe are
each crimes punishable by imprisonment for more
than one year under the laws of Pennsylvania.
These are the crimes of which the defendant is alleged to have been previously convicted.
If you have found beyond a reasonable doubt
that the firearms and ammunition in question were
manufactured in a state other than Pennsylvania or
internationally and that the defendant possessed the
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firearms and ammunition m Pennsylvania, then you
may, but you're not required to, find that they weie
transported across the state line The term "firearm" means any weapon which will or is designed
to or ma\ be readily converted to expel a piojectile
by the action of an explosive
The crime of being a previously convicted felon
m possession of firearms or ammunition is a general intent crime, not a specific intent crime That
means that the Government must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly
possessed the firearms and ammunition in question
The Government is not required to prove the defendant knew that it was unlawful for a previously
convicted felon to possess firearms
(Trans 4 at 128-31 ) The record indicates, then, that
the jury was instructed that the three or four convictions testified to by Agent Barrett all carried a penalty
of one or more years m prison The Court did not
instruct the jurors that they needed to conclude that
Dolbin was convicted of the prior crimes, or that he
possessed firearms and ammunition Simply put. the
Court instructed the jury as to an apparent stipulation
entered into by the parties-that the crimes for which
Dolbin was allegedly convicted each earned a sentence of one or moie years-to minimize prejudice to
Dolbin that might arise from stating more details lelated to the alleged convictions or the precise terms
for which he was imprisoned Similarly, the Court
instructed the jury as to the parties' stipulation that
the weapons were manufactured outside Pennsylvania but emphasized that the jury could determine
whether they weie transported across state lines (Id
at 111-12) Dolbin has not shown any way that the
lury instructions on this charge impropeily abdicated
the Government's burden of pi oof Attorney Quinn
uas not ineffective for failing to raise this issue Indeed, as set forth m detail m the preceding section,
the overwhelming e\ idence presented against him at
tnal would prevent tne Court from finding prejudice
even m the event such decision was enoioneous
*10 Dolbin next argues that it uas prejudicial for the
indictment to state
Defendant Mark Roberston Dolbin, hawng been
comicted in the Schuylkill County Court of Common Pleas of three or moie uolent felonies or serious drug offenses or both m the following cases

which are crimes punishable by imprisonment for a
term exceeding one year, did knowingly possess in
and affecting commerce firearms and ammunition
as listed below
{Id at 128-29) Though the indictment does include
such a statement, the jury was instructed that the indictment was not to be taken as proof or evidence of
the crimes charged therein Specifically, the Court
stated, "I remind you, jurors, that an indictment itself
is not e\ idence It merely describes the charges made
against the defendants It is an accusation It may not
be considered by you as any evidence of the guilt of
either defendant" {Id at 114 ) This curative instruction combined w ith the Court's explanation that Dolbm's prior convictions were an element of one of the
crimes charged by the Government, indicates that
Dolbin was not prejudiced such that the Court would
have any reasonable suspicion the outcome of the
trial would have been different absent the presentation of that information to the jury
The Court now turns to Dolbin's complaint that he
was prejudiced when the Court referred to him as "a
pre\ lously convicted felon" m the discussion of trie
obstruction of justice charge {Id at 131 ) Since being
a previously conducted felon is not relevant to his
guilt regarding the obstruction of justice chaige, unnecessary reiteration of this fact has the possibility of
causing some prejudice to Defendant However, the
jury had already been presented with evidence that
Dolbin had a prior criminal history and was a convicted felon Given that evidence of his past felony
convictions was admissible m reference to the felon
m possession of firearms count, the Court finds that
the meie reference to his criminal history one additional time was not unduly prejudicial It is implausible that this additional refeience to Dolbin s criminal
history affected the outcome of Dolbm's case, in light
of the mountain of evidence against him
Defendant also takes issue with the Courts instruction that flight from law enforcement ma> oe taken as
circumstantial evidence of guilt (Id at 132) The
instruction stated
Turors, vouve heard evidence concerning Defendant Mark Robertson Dolbm's flight from law enforcement agents on May 12th 2003, following his
alleged commission of crimes as charged by the
Government Evidence of the defendants flieht af-
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ter a ci lme has been committed may be considered
by you to prove the defendant's consciousness of
guilt Whether or not evidence of flignt shows a
consciousness of guilt and the significance, if any,
to be attached to such circumstances are matters
solely for your determination
(Id at 131-32) Courts have consistently held that
evidence of flight is admissible and may be interpreted as an indication of consciousness of guilt
United States v Gieen, 25 F 3d 206 (3d CirlQ94)
(evidence of defendant's flight was properly admitted
to show consciousness of guilt when defendant fled
upon spotting federal authorities), United States v
Miles 468 F 2d 482 489-90 Hd Cn 1972) (finding
proper trial judge's instruction that flight may be
deemed evidence of guilt) In this case, the instruction was warranted because Roger Frey and several
law enforcement officers testified that Dolbm attempted to flee from law enforcement by initiating a
high-speed car chase, abandoning his vehicle, and
evading police on foot The instruction given by the
Court is almost synonymous with that currently recommended by the Third Circuit Model Criminal Jury
Instructions — See Tmrd Circuit Criminal Tury Instructions 4 30
FN3 The model instruction reads as follows "You have heard testimony that after
the crime was supposed to have been committed, [Dolbm evaded police attempts to arrest him ] If you believ e that [Dolbm fled
police], then you may consider this conduct,
along with all the other evidence, m deciding whether the government has proved beyond a reasonable doubt tnat he committed
the crime charged
Whether or not this
evidence causes you to find that the defendant was conscious or his guilt of the crime
charged, and whether that indicates that he
committed the crime chaiged, is entirely up
to you as the sole mdges of the facts " Third
Circuit Criminal Tun Instiuctions 4 30
*11 Though Dolbm argues that the Court's use of the
definite pronoun "the" rather than the indefinite pronoun "a" prejudicially implied that he definitively
had committed the alleged crime and did flee, rather
than leav mg those questions for the jury's determination The Court disagrees Taken as a whole, the instruction does not imply that evidence of Defendant's

flight need be accepted, that the Government had
affirmatively proved that Defendant committed the
crimes alleged, or that me evidence of flight necessarily indicated Defendant's guilt Rather, the instruction informed the jury that they could, at their own
discretion, take the evidence related to Defendant's
flight and use it as evidence that Defendant knew he
had committed the crimes chaiged Moreover though
the instruction did not indicate which enmes the evidence of flight may indicate Defendant was conscious of, Dolbm's contention that it improperly implied the jury may take the evidence of flight as evidence of the obstruction of justice charge is mentless
Tunes are assumed to "attend closely the particular
language of the trial court's instructions m a criminal
case and strive to understand, make sense of, and
follow the instructions given them " I rated States v
Hernandez, 176 F 3d 719 734 (3d Cir 1999) (quoting
FT anus v Franklin, All U S 307 324 105 S Ct
1965 85 LEd2d 344 (1985)) It is not rational for
anyone to conclude that flight which occurred befoie
a crime is alleged to have occuned could be an indication of consciousness of guilt for the subsequent
came Accordingly, the Court finds that Dolbm has
not shown this jury instruction to be prejudicial in
any way, and Defense Counsel was not deficient for
failing to object to it
Last, Dolbm argues that admission of the Government's summary chart, effectively a time line of w hat
the Government argued happened in the case, was
prejudicial and should not have been admitted The
Court notes that the chart w as not initially submitted
to the jury with the other exhibits (Trans 4 at 145 )
Rather, the jury requested to see the chart during deliberations (Id) Defense Counsel Quinn did object to
the submission of the chart to the jury, but his objection was overruled (Id at 146 ) To the extent Dolbm
argues that Quinn was ineffective for making onl> a
"weak" objection, which lesultcd in Ins objection
being overruled, this aigument fails (Id at 147 ) After determining that trie chart contained a concise
time line of what the Government believed it had
proved and was supported by evidence presented at
trial, the Court admitted the chart into the jury room
as an exhibit The Court included the following cautionary instruction with the chart
The chart or time line contains a summary of what
the Government believes the evidence m the case
established As I instructed you earlier, the detei-

©2010 Thomson Reuters NoClaimtoOng US Gov Woiks

PaeelO
Slip Copy, 2010 WL 1904528 (M.D.Pa.)
(Cite as: 2010 WL 1904528 (M.D.Pa.))
mination of the facts in the case is yours. The chart
will be provided to you with the understanding that
it represents the Government's summary of what it
believes is the evidence.
*12 (Id. at 147.) The Third Circuit Court of Appeals
has upheld the introduction of summaries or charts as
a means to clarify an abundance of evidence. See
United States v. Svme. 276 F.3d 131. 151 (3d
Cir.2004); Third Circuit Model Criminal Jury Instructions 4.10 & 4.11. The Government created the
time line, and the Court admitted it, to help the jury
organize the information presented. A jury is presumed to follow the Court's instructions, and the instructions clearly provided that the chart was not evidence, but rather a summary of the Government's
case. The instruction emphasized that it was for the
jury to determine whether the facts alleged on the
chart occurred. Thus, particularly when considered in
light of the strongly-worded admonition to the jury
that the chart was not evidence, but rather a summary
of the Government's view of the case, the Court finds
that Dolbin was not prejudiced by its admission.
Accordingly, Dolbin's arguments that the jury instructions violated his right to due process or were
the result of ineffective assistance of counsel will be
denied.
C. Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel
On appeal, Dolbin was represented by Damien
Schorr. Dolbin contends that Schorr was ineffective
for failing to argue on appeal that Dolbin's trial counsel was ineffective. This argument is meritless because ineffective assistance of counsel is a claim that
is ordinarily considered only in collateral proceedings. United States v. Thornton. 327 F.3d 268. 271
(3d Cir.2003) ("It has long been the practice of this
court to defer the issue of ineffectiveness of trial
counsel to a collateral attack/'). While a claim of
ineffective assistance may be considered on direct
appeal in the rare circumstances where the record is
sufficient to allow determination of the issue, the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals has held that even in
such instances, the better practice is to consider the
claim first at the district court level in collateral proceedings. Id.; see also Mas saw v. United States. 538
U.S. 500. 123 S.Ct. 1690, 155 L.Ed.2d 714 (2003).
Indeed. Dolbin has now properly raised the issue and
has had a chance to litisate his ineffective assistance
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of counsel claims. Both because he has brought such
claims before the Court in this motion and because
the Court has found them non-meritorious, Dolbin
cannot claim that he was prejudiced by appellate
counsel's failure to raise his ineffective assistance
claim on direct appeal.
D. Preliminary Hearing Counsel's Conflict of Interest
Last, Dolbin alleges an ineffective assistance claim
against pre-trial Defense Counsel Emmanuel Dimitriou. Attorney Dimitriou represented Dolbin at the
pretrial stage from June 5, 2003, until December 19,
2003. (Doc. Nos.14, 59.) While representing Dolbin,
Dimitriou advised Dolbin to participate in a proffer
session with the Government. Dimitriou also filed a
motion to suppress evidence, but withdrew from the
representation prior to argument on the motion. (Doc.
Nos.15, 54.) Dimitriou sought recusal from the case
on two bases: potential conflict of interest and breakdown of communications between attorney and client. Dimitriou explained that James Dennison, a former client, would be a potential witness for the Government against Dolbin. (Doc. No. 54 % 8.) Dimitriou
stated that continued representation of Dolbin would
result in a violation of Pennsylvania Rule of Professional Conduct 1.9, which states that an attorney who
has formerly represented a client shall not thereafter
represent another person in a similar matter with interests materially adverse to the former client. Dimitriou's withdrawal motion also explained that Dolbin
had failed to pay him a nonrefundable retainer and
failed to comply with his advice, which led to deterioration of the relationship between attorney and
client. (Id. ffi[ 15-16.) Dolbin suggests that Dimitriou's loyalty to Dennison created an actual conflict
of interest that existed prior to his withdrawal and
that the conflict was materially adverse to Dolbin's
best interests because the proffer session did not result in a plea bargain. Dolbin urges the Court to find
that Dimiiriou's advice that Dolbin enter into a proffer session with the Government was motivated by
Dimitriou's desire to help Dennison.
*13 Claims that counsel had an actual conflict of interest with the defendant are generally cognizable in
§ 2255 proceedings. United States v. Morena, 547
F.3d 191. 198 (3cTcir.2008). In this case, the alleged
conflict stems not from joint representation, but multiple representation, which means an actual conflict is
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less likely to exist. Duncan v. Morton, 256 F.3d 189,
197 (3d Cir.2001) ("Actual conflict is more likely to
occur in cases of joint representation (of codefendants at the same trial) than in cases of multiple
representation (of co-defendants at separate trials).").
Also, a potential conflict of interest is insufficient to
support a Sixth Amendment violation. Id. To prove a
conflict of interest that violates the Sixth Amendment, a defendant must show "1) multiple representation that 2) created an actual conflict of interest that
3) adversely affected the lawyer's performance."
Government of Virgin Islands v. Zepp, 748 F.2d 125,
135 (3d Cir.1984). A court must make the determination of whether the conflict violates the Sixth
Amendment in consideration of the "circumstances
surrounding the particular case." Id. at 134. Though
prejudice will be presumed if the defendant shows an
actual conflict of interest, a defendant must nonetheless demonstrate that there was a lapse in representation contrary to the defendant's interests. Palmer v.
Hendricks, 592 F.3d 386. 398 (3d Cir.203 0); United
States v. Gambino, 864 F.2d 1064. 1070 (3d
Cir.1988). A defendant can do this by 1) demonstrating a plausible alternative defense strategy or tactic
that might have been pursued and 2) that such a tactic
was inherently in conflict with the attorney's other
loyalty. Gambim, 864 F.2d at 1070.
Dolbin posits the following facts in support of his
theory that a conflict of interest existed in violation of
his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.— Attorney
Dimitriou became aware of the potential conflict of
interest arising from his representation of Dolbin and
his prior representation of Dennison early-on in the
case. Dolbin revealed to Attorney Dimitriou that
Dennison was involved in the conspiracy, and Dennison had, likewise, come to Attorney Dimitriou for
advice regarding his role in the conspiracy. Knowing,
then, that Dolbin's proffer session with the Government would likely reveal information about Dennison's involvement, Dimitriou nonetheless advised
Dolbin to proffer with the Government so that Dolbin
might receive a plea bargain capping his sentence at
ten years. Plea negotiations between Dolbin and the
Government fell through on or around October 8,
2003. Dimitriou stated his intent to withdraw from
Dolbin's representation by November 25, 2003. at the
latest. (Doc. No. 50.) On or around December 2,
2003, Attorney Dimitriou formally moved to withdraw his appearance on behalf of Dolbin. (Doc. No.
54.) On December 19. 2003, Dimitriou's motion was
granted, and by December 22, 2003, Attorney Quinn

was retained in his place. (Doc. No. 60.) Dolbin did
not sign a plea agreement with the Government, went
to trial, and did not testify on his own behalf because
the Government would have used his proffer statements to impeach him.
FN4. The Court takes all facts alleged by
Dolbin as true unless conclusively refuted
by the record. Because the Court finds that
the facts as alleged and records of the case
show conclusively that Dolbin is not entitled
to relief, there is no need for an evidentiary
hearing. United States v. Day. 969 F.2d 39,
41 (3d Cir.1992). Moreover, Attorney
Dimitriou is unavailable for an evidentiary
hearing, as he passed away prior to the filing
of this motion.
*14 Dolbin argues that these facts indicate that Attorney Dimitriou's advice to talk to the Government
demonstrates a conflict of interest and a decision adverse to Dolbin's best interests. Yet. these facts also
indicate that Attorney Dimitriou knew that any discussion Dolbin had with the Government would
likely inculpate, rather than benefit, James Dennison.
It is difficult, then, to understand how Attorney
Dimitriou's suggestion that Dolbin implicate the person Dimitriou was allegedly trying to protect demonstrates an actual conflict of interest.
First, Dennison was not indicted for the conspiracy
with Dolbin and had, according to Dolbin's implications, been working with the Government from
shortly after Dolbin's arrest. Though Attorney Dimitriou had been retained by Dennison in other matters,
Dennison was not indicted for this conspiracy at any
point, thus Dimitriou was not at any time representing codefendants in this same action. Moreover, to
the extent Dolbin suggests that his proffer directly
disadvantaged him because it bolstered the credibility
of Dennison's potential testimony against him, Dolbin
acknowledges that the Government would have been
unable to use Dolbin's proffer statements for that
purpose. The Government had agreed that Dolbin's
statements could only be used against him at trial if
he testified to materially different facts. (Doc. No.
293 at 8.) In addition to being unavailable at trial for
the purpose of bolstering Dennison's testimony, the
statements were never used at all because Dennison
was never called to testify against Dolbin. Dolbin
simply cannot show from these facts that there was

©2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

Page 12
Slip Copy, 2010 WL 1904528 (M.D.Pa.)
(Cite as: 2010 WL 1904528 (M.D.Pa.))
an actual conflict of interest or that Dimitriou's loyalty to Dennison had any ill-effect on his representation ofDolbin.

sel Dimitriou that amounts to a violation of his Sixth
Amendment right to' counsel.
III. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Moreover, Dolbin has not posited a different defense
strategy that could have been taken but would have
worked to Dennison's detriment. The only other defense strategy that could have been taken so early in
the litigation would have been to not cooperate with
the Government and to assert his Fifth Amendment
right to silence. It is untenable that this strategy
would have been adverse to Dennison's interests, and
inconceivable that it could have been more damaging
to Dennison's interests than the strategy actually advised by Dimitriou. A coincidence of interests is not
tantamount to a conflict of interests. See Gawbino,
864F.2dat 1071 ("[T]here is no conflict of interest...
if an attorney at trial does not raise a defense on behalf of his client because to do so is not in that client's interest even though it is also in the interest of
another client that it not be raised.").
It is true that the proffer session made it difficult for
Dolbin to testify at trial because he admitted to many
of the charges against him. However, as Dolbin admitted in his brief, the initial strategy was to cooperate with the Government so as to receive the benefit
of a plea bargain and downward departures at sentencing rather than to attend trial. In light of the significant evidence against him, this strategy appears
entirely reasonable. The Court further notes that the
record indicates that Attorney Dimitriou did not simply abandon Dolbin amid important plea negotiations. Instead, the record reveals that plea negotiations between Dolbin and the Government had broken down by October 8, 2003. (Doc. No. 35 K 12.)
Dimitriou did not move to withdraw from representing Dolbin until over a month later. (Doc. No. 54.)
Further, Dimitriou arranged for another attorney to
represent Dolbin at the arraignment for the Superceding Indictment, which indicates that Dimitriou did
not leave Dolbin without assistance at any key point
m the proceedings. Dolbin was able to retain Attorney Qumn within days of Attorney Dimitriou's formal motion to withdraw. Thus the record refutes
Dolbin's assertion that Dimitriou's decision to withdraw from the case had, in itself, an adverse impact
on his case.
*15 The Court finds that Dolbin has not demonstrated an actual conflict of interest by pretrial coun-

As required by Rule 11 of the Rules Governing Section 2255 proceedings, the Court "must issue or deny
a certificate of appealability when it enters a final
order adverse to the applicant." To merit the issuance
of a certificate of appealability, the defendant must
make "a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). As stated
above, Dolbin has not shown that he was prejudiced
by any of defense counsel's alleged inadequacies.
Accordingly, reasonable jurists would agree that he
has not made a showing of the denial of a constitutional right, and there exists no basis for a certificate
of appealability with respect to this motion.
IV. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, for the foregoing reasons, Dolbin's
motion to vacate, correct or modify sentence will be
denied. Dolbin has not demonstrated ihat irial counsel, appellate counsel, or pretrial counsel provided
ineffective assistance in violation of his Sixth
Amendment rights. Because the Court was able to
conclusively determine the merits of the motion
without a hearing, Defendant's motions for hearings
will also be denied. A certificate of appealability is
unwarranted in this case.
An order consistent with this memorandum follows.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 11th day of May 2010, upon consideration of Mark Dolbin's motion to vacate, set
aside and correct sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2255 (Doc. No. 250), motion for notice of setting for
evidentiary fact-finding hearing (Doc. No. 272), consolidated motion for partial judgment on the pleadings (Doc. No. 266), and motion to dismiss as frivolous and without merit government's motion to dismiss pro-se petitioner's section 2255 (Doc. No. 258),
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT THE
MOTIONS are DENIED. A certificate of appealability shall not issue.
M.D.Pa.,2010.
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Addendum C

Addendum C

Opening Statements. The lawyers will outline what the ease is about and
indicate what they think the evidence will show.
Presentation of Evidence. The plaintiff will offer its evidence first followed by
the defendant. Each side may also offer rebuttal evidence after hearing the
witnesses and seeing the exhibits offered by the other side.
Instructions on the Law. After each side has presented its evidence, I will
supplement these written instructions and review them with you.
Closing Arguments. The lawyers will then summarize and argue the case.
They will share with you their respective views of the evidence, how it relates to
the law and how they think you should decide the case.
Jury Deliberation. The final step is for you to retire to the jury room and
deliberate until you reach a verdict.
5.

THE CHARGE(S) and THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
The defendant in this case has been accused of committing a crime. The
accusation is in a written document called an INFORMATION, which will be
read or summarized for you following this instruction. As you listen, keep in
mind that the defendant has answered the charge by saying "not guilty." The
defendant is presumed to be innocent of the charge.
DISTRIBUTION OF OR ARRANGING TO DISTRIBUTE A CONTROLLED
SUBSTANCE, 1673 § 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii), Utah Code Ann., as follows: That on or
about March 10, 2009, at 575 West 200 South, in Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, f t e a s f c ^
luUk/Luu'T iim^>t TMii'i T^ir Au^__f
ffigsr- v\i^4^did knowingly and intentionally distribute a controlled or
counterfeit substance, or agreed, consented, offered, or arranged to distribute a
controlled or counterfeit substance, to wit: Cocaine, a Schedule II controlled
substance.
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6.

WHAT IS THE JURY'S ROLE IN THIS CASE?

You must decide whether the charge against the defendant has been proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. Your decision is called a VERDICT. Your verdict must be
based only on the evidence produced here in court. It must be based on facts, not on
speculation. Don't guess about any fact. However, you may draw reasonable
inferences or arrive at reasonable conclusions from the evidence presented.
7.

WHAT IS EVIDENCE?

Evidence is anything that tends to prove or disprove the existence of a disputed
fact. It can be testimony, or documents, or objects, or photographs, or stipulations, or
certain qualified opinions, or any combination of these things. Some times the lawyers
may agree that certain facts exist. You should accept any agreed or stipulated facts as
having been proved. In limited instances, I may take "judicial notice" of a well-known
fact. If this happens, I will explain how you should treat it.
8.

OPINION TESTIMONY

Under certain circumstances, witnesses are allowed to express an opinion. A
person who by education, study or experience has become an expert in any art, science
or profession, may give his opinion and the reason for it. A layman (or, a non-expert)
is also allowed to express an opinion if it is based on personal observations and it is
helpful to understanding his testimony or the case. You are not bound to believe
anyone's opinion. Consider it as you would any other evidence, and give it the weight
you think it deserves.
9.

WHAT IS NOT TO BE CONSIDERED OR USED AS EVIDENCE?

I've explained to you what evidence is. Now I'll tell you about some things
which do not qualify as evidence or which, for some other good reason, you should not
consider in reaching your verdict.
Accusation. The fact that formal charges have been filed accusing the defendant
of committing a crime is not evidence of guilt.
jurcnmins 6/15/00
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Punishment. You may be aware of the gravity of the offense charged and the
range of potential penalties, but you should not consider what actual punishment
the defendant may receive if found guilty. That is for the judge to decide based
upon the applicable law.
Right to Remain Silent. If the defendant chooses not to testify in this case, don't
consider that as evidence of guilt. The Constitution provides that an accused
person has the right not to testify and you should not draw any negative
inferences based upon the reliance on this right.
Lawyer Statements. What the lawyers say is not evidence. Their purpose is to
give you a preview of expected evidence and to help you understand the
evidence from their viewpoint.
Personal Investigation. Evidence is not what you can find out on your own.
You should not make any investigation about the facts in this case. Do not make
personal inspections, observations or experiments. Do not view premises, things
or articles not produced in court. Don't let anyone else do anything like this for
you. Don't look for information in law books, dictionaries or public or private
records which are not produced in court.
Out of Court Information. Do not consider anything you may have heard or
read about this case in the media or by word of mouth or other out-of-court
communication. You must rely solely on the evidence that is produced and
received in court.
10.

THE JUDGE DECIDES WHAT EVIDENCE IS ADMISSIBLE

Sometimes a question will be raised about whether certain evidence is proper for
the jury to consider. This type of question is called an OBJECTION. I rule on
objections. If an objection is SUSTAINED the evidence is kept out and you should not
consider it. If an objection is OVERRULED the evidence comes in and you may
consider it. If evidence is STRICKEN you should ignore it.

jurcnmins 6/15/00

Page 6

INSTRUCTION NO.

27A

The Court previously instructed you to delete certain language in Instruction No.
5 which you have done. This Court prepared Instruction No. 5 from a standard set of
Instructions and inadvertently included the language you have been asked to delete from
another Instruction. It is not a part of this charge, was inadvertently included in it, and
no evidence has been presented in this case to support such a statement. Accordingly,
you should disregard that language.

